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IN THE SUPREME COuRT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT
COUNCIL 67, WESTERN
CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA - A.F.L. - C.I.O., MILO
B. RASH, CLARENCE LOTT
and JOSEPH W. BALLEW,
Defenoonts and Appellants.

Case No. 8823

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

HANSON, BALDWIN and ALLEN
WALTER L. BUD·GE
Attorneys for Pl!aintiff
and Respandent
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LAW OFFICES

HANSON, BALDWIN &ALLEN
520 CONTINENTAL B~NK BUILDING

SALT LAKE GITY, UTAH

REX J. HANSON
ERNEST F. BALDWIN,JR.

TELEPHONE ELGIN 9-7611

ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
WALTER L.BUDGE
ROBERT W. BRANDT

June

16, 1958

F \LED
JUN 1 81958

Mr. L. M. Cummings

Clerk of the Supreme Court
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

Dear

~tr.

Dairy Distributors ve. Local Union 976 et al
Case No. 8823

Cummings:

In accordance with the permission granted by the Chief
Justice during the oral argument on this case, we wish
to make the follol~ing corrections on the respondent's
brief by interlineation:

On Page 4, after the word "unloaded'• on line 10,

reading from the top of the page, the following
should be inserted, "by Dorman's and myself and
a couple of Dorman's boys."
On Page 7 of the brief, four lines reading from
the top, the word "August" should be changed to
"October."

Ver.y tru1y yours,
HAWSOll ~ BALDWIN & ALLEN

_e)~
R.JH•jh
cc • C1a.--ae a.ek
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LAW OFFICES

HANSON, BALDWIN &ALLEN
520 CONTINENTAL BANK BUILDING

SALT 1~AKE G:rTY, UTAH

REX ..J, HANS.ON
ERNEST

r.

BALDWIN,..JR.

TELEPHONE ELGIN 9-7611

ARTHUR A.ALLEN,..JR.
WAI..TER L.BUDGE
ROBERT W. BRANDT

July 7, 1958

Hon. Rodger I. RoDdnougb

Chief Juatioe aDd llellbera
SUpreme Court· ot Utah

State C.ap1to1

oE the Court

at1ld1~

Salt Lake C1ty, Utah

Re:

Da1ey Distributors, IM .•

Plaintit.t and Respondent
-vsLocal Union 976, et al,

Defendants and Appella.nts
case No. 8823

Honorable Judges:

~lith the Court • s indulgence and permission, we seelt to dra-v1
the Court's attention to two matters concerning the briefa of the

parties in this appeal.
First:.

E;x-ror :Ln reapond•nt t s

(our)

br:i.ef.

By .:i.nadverta:noe

the term Hresponoentsn appears in place of "'appellants" on the
follo'l1ing pages:

Page 36. second paragraph. line 2 1 1 and last line.
Past ~~· line 8 from top of page.
Pag
, next to last line.
Second: The following st.atement taken rro_m app.ellants • reply
to respondent's brief. At page 12 ot said brief appellants write:

"Reapondent next appears to uae the CIIJBPbell Coal case

and the f:rv1oe Trade

Cba~f!Ml•

oaae aa a weapon against

appell.an·•· basedon tSeaaan.uaptlOn that the caobe
Valley Dairy Aasociat~on was the primary employer and
that the plaintiff. the Da~ry Distributors. Inc. was not
a primary employer but waa a secondary company. The

•;-g; ..

appell.aat baa adopted tbe view • as did the trial court •
that a1noe OOatmer - • the
uaser. empl~er

and ac'uaCErator .tar. R1.1iJ1_!_ _ wbioh proceaaed
aDd U.na
ed UMt itiei•• a
UleM epeara•s.ona.
alt~
oa1l7 UDder aepenw 1...1 enl•S..•• -.re
oOIIIPle~IJ' 1ntecra~ed and 1n~erdependeat. the~ ~a&&t be

•111cl•

re~ •• •
opera,lon
Taft Act." {~aels ldded)

ror

tbe purpose

or
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tbe

We f1Dd a.tbtns in the reeord to eubatantiate any such
declaration. We invite your appellan'a do o1te tbe testimony, page
and volUM, \\POD w..ieb .. . _ -would · M17 t• ~· erftmett,_ ate. tement.

Indeed, the reoord la ·•leull' ·tMt ._ _ ..,u&l7.
Testiaol17 Ill U.J.D ~~ ahtlf8t
Wba\

1e )'our PI'Of•aien or OM"J)at.tent

A.

M:r preteuiea 1e oheeae· ~

~.

At tbe present time do you have any connection
Cache Valley Dair;;"l!tena lH-aeociat1on?

.~.

I manage the chk1esi::; opex•ation; I manage ·t.;l'Hi; \'Jhole
operation.

t.~.

Hot'f long have you been so e1n:ployed by t~hii;;~nl as a manager

....
t~.

Plan•• _ (Tr. 8)

and I MDIO a obeeae

the

d~ilj

o£ their cheese or dairy operation'?

I got a contt"act v1itb the Cache Valley

Dail"~Y

;',.ssociation

in October of 1941,. to process their milk into cheese,
and other dairy products, on a percent;a.ge bnsis.

'~:.

Can you tell the Court and jury something o.bout wbat
the Cache Valley Dairymens Association is., \'<rhat is it ir:
ordinary terminology?

A.

The C8.cba Vall.ey Dairy Assoe~at1on is a group of farrnerc
that formed wba't is fo:n.ul.ly .knOwn aa a co-op -ror the
purpose or marketing the m1l.k that they produce on the
ta:rras abd receive the highest pri.ce for the milk possible.
(Tr. 8)

aDd

~.ri th

*.. * *
on oro- exa•'•'~'

A.

Tbat !.a what

* .. •

1;he

oontraot read.

(Tr. 41)
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Hon. Rot!lser 1. MoDonoUSh
Cb1et' 3Uit1ce and Members or the court
Salt lake C1ey; tftab

Pace (3)

Arne Hanson
Q.

te~tttie4:

In '8fJUr b~l·._~.·~~ GOftpaUon tOJt h!rr

DS.atrlwtora •• ~~'• •111 .,..u tell ''ll• eou.rt
and 3U%7' tbe manner 1ft Wh10b JOU kept the books for

Dairy Distributors, what procedure was tollowed?

A.

We kept a complete ·•et of books. on all operations r4
Dairy l)istribu.tora, led,;era and everJtb1ns;, and had
an aUditor there eve17, qaartor· arMS 1•~'1¥ a etaMment
was made· tor tax purpo&ee. (lfr. 64, 65)

*... * *
and on

voir-due:
t)..

A.

There is nothing in

the~e

the Association up there?
No sir.

books that ha.a to do with

(Tr. 66)

* * *
1'his testimony and an abundance of other testimony or record
shot1S that Gosancr was an imPl:S?YI! ot Cache Valley Da1rymens Association,
and that Goesner tlas an iQCQt:RQra,!to~: and ~ ot Dairy Distributors.
Inc. The truth ot the matter ia that deten«ants and appellants kna..1

that such v1ere the tacts.

Rosa Tboreeon testified:

"During tbia meeting tor the :t1rst time the Union asked
us to include tbe emplc.vees ot Dairy. D:istributora under
a contract and I advi.sed them we oouldn•t include them
in the same contract because 1n our op1.nJ.on tbere were
two dUt'erent 001\P*Dlea and there would bave to be · two
separate oontraota, aDd one <d them aaid that would be
all riSh~ it we WG\lld agree to it 'bUt that the drivers
bad to be covered w1tb contract to.
(Tr. 186. 187)
t-1

There ia no Juat11'1cati.on for appelJ.anto • bald statement that
the tra1 court "•.dopted the view • * • tha't Goaaner • • • • • the ~
:J:H~-•117
* • *or "i'\iOh .
~ not onl¥ ~ppear•" to~
vi.ew" ~
don 8811 since
tbe ~Dt ot tl'da ac1iJ.OD baa ------~ al~Jtaj,aed• aa tbe record
llbowa. tbat Bdw1.D ao.~ waa u ~..
eapr ~-cache Vall.e7
~ Aaaoeiat1ora. aDG tta•a

.IM&llif2:HP'·"

._.11Nn• ..._
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Hon. Hoogel"~ I. r~-!)Onougl·~
Chiet J\.UJtioc and 14t'lmbera
8alt Lake City, Utah

or

tho Court

Page (L~)

tt..

The cache \talle~t Dairy Association ia a group ot
ranters that tormed \c!{hat is tonually 1-::nown as ~
co-op tor the purpose of marlteting the milk that

they produc(~ on tho tarm.s and l.~ecei ve the highest
price tor the nlilk: possible. ( i:rr.. 8)

cacl:le V::1lley Distributoro, Inc. lias not an

linen or at all of t;hc Dair.}t-mena Association.

o~ration,

ttstraight

{By Nir. Hanson). t~1ll you tell th~ court atxl ~Jury
ttrho the officers eu1d stoeJ.-"Jloldel~s ot this corporation

11erc?

l'he stoeldlolderts t~rere ~tra. Go~sner, ~~ v;:!:l:e,; and nzy-aelf and my non Ed'Vlin Juni :n: ~ and Delores., m:s daughter',
and A nie ltannent!
officers arc: I mn prosidcnt of thG corporation.,
Gossn~;,;:r, v:l.ce-pre:?lident, ~1r1d A,:r-n1e Hanz)on j.s
£Jecrettn:;y"~,troa~1U.l"er.

':ll1:.:;

rtro.
,•

Ncn1 * au I unf::icx'rJtand your tostil;;.ony,,

(.;:Olnpany HtH3

o~·gan1.zed

l10'l.1

did

:in l.95a and what was the cond1.t1.on of.", or
yWl· bu~1ooas go f'rom tl1at t1tne on until about

1955. the spring ot 1955?

A•

The business ~ms surprisingly successful. It started
out small and natw~ally lie had enough cheese to eo to
Ne\~ York, but t'le had equipment that ~"as not net<tt.
t1e
encountered our problems 1 but l'le znade money on every
trip l>1hieh enablad us to buy additional equipment and

enlarge our operation., and .find sooo back hauls in New
Yorlt and vicl.n.tty • and we to\U'ld a better marlcet £or
those products every year out 1n this country. so it
became a very successtu1. and a very pro£~tab1e operat:1.on. (Tr. 13, 14)
To say otherwise ia to be-Ue the record.

Reapecth.lly sWbi.tted.

,

, JHa1e

...
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT
COUNCIL 67, WESTERN
CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEUR'S, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA - A.F.L. - C.I.O., MILO
B. RASH, CLARENCE LOTT
and JOSEPH W. BALLEW,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8823

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
ST~TEMENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
DEFENDANTS WERE CLEARLY IN VIOLATION
OF TITLE 29, SECTION 187, LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT AND MUST THEREFORE RESPOND
IN DAMAGES AS THE ACT PROVIDES.
1
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT
COUNCIL 67, WESTERN
CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEUR'S, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA - A.F.L. - C.I.O., MILO
B. RASH, CLARENCE LOTT
and JOSEPH W. BALLEW,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8823

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS WERE CLEARLY IN VIOLATION
OF TITLE 29, SECTION 187, LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT AND MUST THEREFORE RESPOND
IN DAMAGES AS THE ACT PROVIDES.
1
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tributors ceased shipping to New York and the
Cache Valley Dairymen's Association attempted
thereafter to ship its cheese by common carrier,
but this operation was interferred with because
of ''ta:bor trouble'' at the cheese factory. Dairy Distributors shipped one more truckload of cheese in
September, 1955, which was not unloaded because
of union interference and which had to be placed
in storage. In October, another load was shipped,·
which was picketed but unloaded. Subsequent to
October, 1955, Dairy Distributors made no further
attempt to transport cheese to New York, their
only profitable trucking operation, and began disposing of their equipment. The termination of the
trucking operation by the corporation was neither
vo1untary nor optional They were forced into a
position of incurring a risk too great to bear. With
each individual load of cheese representing an investment of twelve thousand dollars ( $12,000.00),
no smafl family corporation such as Dairy Distributors could~ afford the danger of being stranded
with such costly, highly perishable cargo at the
farthest place in the nation from its home operation.
'Thereafter, on June 29, 1956, suit was commenced. IThe jury returned its verdict in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants, Local
Union No. 976, Joint Council No. 67, the Western
4
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Conference of Teamsters, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and
Helpers of America A.F.L.-C.I.O. and Joseph
Ballew in the sum of $100,000.00 on October 29,
1957.
From the judgment on the verdict this appeal
resu1ts.
ST~TEMENT OF FACTS
To the cause at bar the operation of the Cache
Valley Dairy Association is merely incidental. We
are here concerned with the damage done Dairy
Distributors, Inc. by the wrongful acts of the defendants in this independent corporation's conduct of
its business. The fact that Edwin Gossner was employed by the Dairy Association and was also an
incorporator and president of Dairy Distributors
is not 1naterial although defendants' activities were
directed against both the Association and Dairy
Distributors, Inc. The facts cannot be in dispute.
Dairy Distributors, Inc. was a separate corporate
entity entirely set apart from the Cache Valley
Dairying Association or any other business enterprise (Tr. 66); any contention of the defendants
to the contrary notwithstanding.
The incorporators and stockho1ders of Dairy
Distributors, Inc. were Edwin Gossner, his wife,
his son Edwin, Jr., his daughter Delores and one
Arnie Hansen ( Tr. 13). These people formed this
5
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closed corporation in September of 1952 (Tr. 12) ·
The executive board of the Cache Valley Dairying
Association had declined to go into the trucking
business (Tr. 11). Dairy Distributors purchased
the necessary motorized equipment and employed
the necessary personnel to carry on the trucking
operation ( Tr. 14-15). The net profit for the years
1953, 1954 and the first half of 1955 averaged
$1,000.00 per month CTr. 29).
Dairy Distributors' principal source of income
was from business transacted with Dorman and
Company of New York City (Tr. 16). On or about
July 2'7th of 19'55, Dorman advised Dairy Distributors tha:t there was a picket line in front of the
Dorman establishment and that Dorman employees
would not cross the picket line and did not want
to unload the cheese from Dairy Distributors' truck
(Tr. 16). See Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 13, 14, and 15. The picketing signs read:
NOTICE
The Cheese Carried and Delivered
By This Truck Has Been Worked
Processed By
NON-UNION
EMPLOYEES
of the Cache Valley DairyMens Assoc. Smithfield, Utah
Teamsters Joint Council No. 67
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13 (Emphasis added).
6
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From that time on Dairy Distributors' business
was disrupted (Tr. 17); they made but two more
shipments of cheese to New York, one in September
and another in August. N orma1ly Dairy Distributors had tvvo trucks on the road steadily, one going
east and one returning to the west ( Tr. 15). There
had never previously been a dispute between Dairy
Distributors, or the Dairy Distributors' employees,
and the Teamsters Union ('Tr. 21, 22). The Union
had attempted to secure recognition as the representative of the employees of Cache Valley Dairymens Association fTr. 22). On cross examination
the witness Edwin Gossner was asked:

Q. Have you made an effort to get in
any other kind of business since October 1955
if you employed this equipment?
And thereafter the record shows :
A. I was told by Rash they would picket every place we would go, it would be financial suicide unless we find out about picketing and secondary boycott.
Q. The reason you went out of business
was because of the picketing difficulties?
A. The Dairy cheese picketing in New
York.
Q. The sole reason you went out of
business was because you had serious labor
difficulties?
A. Dairy Distributors had no labor dif...
ficulties to my knowledge.
7
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Q. Who did have the difficulties, why
did you go out of business then?
A. On account of the cheese couldn't be
handled any more 'by Dairy Distributors. The
employees didn't give me any trouble,- had
no labor trouble.
Q. The reason you did go out of business was because of labor difficulties as I
get it?
A. Because of picketing. (Tr. 40).
Arnie Hansen, bookeeper for Dairy Distributors, identified the corporation's books. He testified
that the books of Dairy Distributors had nothing
to do with the Cache VaHey Dairymens Association
('Tr. 66).

Paul B. Tanner, Certified Public Accountant,
was auditor for Dairy Distributors (Tr. 68, 69).
The corporation audits were admitted in evidence
(Tr. 71). The books and audits show the corporation's operation to have been a profitable one. When
the books were closed the assets were $56,131.00
as against liabilities of $6,808.71 ( Tr. 224).
Plaintiff called Milo Rash, the Secretary and
'Treasurer of Local Union 976, and Trustee of Joint
Council67 (Tr. 102). ·This witness, in company with
the defendant Joseph W. BaTlew, an employee of
the Western Council of Teamsters (Tr. 142), went
to New York on or about May 31, 1955 to see Mr.
Louie Dorman (Tr. 102). They there went to the
8
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Local Union of which Dorman employees were members and had the Secretary-Treasurer of that Union,
a Mr. Ristuccia, cafl Dorman to the Union office
(Tr. 103). The witness was evasive as to what took
place at that meeting. (Tr. 103, 104). On July 26
and 27, this witness picketed Dairy Distributors'
truck at Dormans in New York City (Tr. 105-110)
as did Clarence Lott (Tr. 234). Rash conversed
with one Rosen, a member of the New York Local
Union and a foreman of Dorman employees, at the
time of the picketing (Tr. 111, 112). On cross
examination this witness testified:
A. Our purpose in going to New York
was to talk to Mr. Dorman and try to get him
to put pressure on Mr. Gossner with us and,
of course, the question to cover the employees
of Cache Valley.
Q. Cache Valley Dairy?
A. And also the truck driver, I asked
several times they meet with us. (Tr. 114115).
And,
Q. When you went to New York, who
was the duly organized bargaining agent for
the employees?
A. 976. (Tr. 115).
However, on re-direct this witness admitted:

Q. And at the time you went back to
New York, is it your contention Number 976
had been certified by the National Labor Re9
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lations Board as bargaining agent for those
employees or not?
A. We were recognized bargaining
agent by his signed contract before.
Q. Had you been certified by the N ational Labor Relations Board when you went
back to New York?
A. It wasn't necessary.
Q. Answer "yes" or "no" : Had you been
certified by the N ationa:l Labor Relations
Board when you went back to New York on
May 31st, 1955?
A. No.
Q. And have you been certifed, your
organization been certified as bargaining
agent of the employees of the Dairy Distributors when you went back to New York on
May 31st, 1955?
A. The same answer, "no".
Q. Have you ever had a contract with
any of the employees of Dairy Distributors
when you went back to New York in May
of 1955?
A. Before that?
Q. With the employees of Dairy Distributors?
A. Before 1955?
Q. Yes?
A. Some of the employees that drove
Dairy Distributors trucks were Union members before- in 1952.
10
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Q. That isn't what I asked you.
I asked you whether you had a contract
with Dairy Distributors before 1955, or at
any time?
A. No. We didn't know there was any
difference between them and Cache Valley
Dairy Association, then. (Tr. 118, 119).
Local Union 976 of which the witness was
Secretary-Treasurer was under a trusteeship and
the trustee, John M. Annan of Los Angeles, California, was appointed to that position by the International Union (Tr. 121-123). On further re-direct
examination and as to "Mr. Ballew" and the "Teamsters" the witness stated:
Q. Mr. Rash, did I understand you to
say Mr. Ballew was sent here to Utah to
assist you in your problem?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And he was - where did he come
from?
A. The office of the Western States
Dairy Employees Council, it is at Seattle,
Washington.
Q. Is that a division of the Western
Conference of 'Teamsters?
A. It is not the Western Council of
Teamsters, I don't believe. It is a separate
division that the local Unions that have members working in the dairy industry pay a per
capita tax on the members, they have in the
dairy industry, into Western States Dairy
Employment Council.
11
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Q. Does Western Teamsters have other
employees except Western dairies?
A. It is a warehouse council, automotive council, over the road council.
Q. And do you have other councils of
emp1oyees?
A. There are other councils.

Q. 'The Western Conference of Teamzt·ers has jurisdiction over what States?
A. Eleven states; the Western Council
of 'Teamsters is comprised of Local Unions in
the eleven western states. (Tr. 127).
The deposition of Harry Rosen, employee of
Dorman, was published (Tr. 130). He was a member of Local 277 of the Teamsters in New York
(Tr. 130). The testimony of this witness concerned
itself with what took place on the morning of July
26, 1955 when he and a "city loader" went to Dormans to unload the Dairy Distributors truck ( Tr.
130-140). (It was a rule of the Local Union that
when a truck came from out of town it could not
be unloaded unless the firm hired a man to help
unload - a "city loader." ( Tr. 131) ) . ·This witness
specifical'ly stated:
A. As I said, I had no knowledge of
anything like that happening until I got there
that morning. I came there to work and knew
nothing about anything happening at all.
Q. All you did in substance and in fact
12
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was, you saw the picket line there and you
assumed that there was a labor controversy,
and so you just did not participate in unloading the truck?
A. That isn't what I said. I say, when
I saw the pickets, I asked them why they were
there. We had no labor trouble at our place.
'The gentleman told me that he had permission from our union to picket the place. Hearing that, I refused to unload the truck. (Tr.
138).
Joseph W. Ballew, representative of the Western States Dairy Employees Council, was caHed
as a witness for the plaintiff. The witness was a
traveling trouble shooter whose duties were to "assist any local unions voluntarily associated with the
Council when requested for assistance in negotiation of contracts, dispute, or strike over employees'
rights * * *." (Tr. 142). Under this employment
the witness trailed a Dairy Distributors' truck to
New York and the Dormans (Tr. 144); taking with
him picket signs (Tr. 145). The Dormans were
anxious to cooperate so there would be no difficulty
with their own employees (Tr. 146). The witness
decided to picket because he felt this would be a
more forceful method of persuasion than asking
plaintiff to do what he would like him to do. (Tr.
150).
Frank Fredrico, driver for Dairy Distrrbutors,
took a truck load of cheese to Dormans, arriving
13
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September 7, 1955. He testified to the following occurrence:
A. We pulled up to Dormans dock as
usual at 6 :00 o'clock in the morning and
Harry came downQ. Harry, was that Harry Rosen?
A. Yes sir.
Q. He said, "What are you fellows doing here?"
Art was the senior truck driver and said,
"We are here with the load of cheese."
Harry said, "I can't unload you, you will
have to wait until the Dormans get here."
Q. What did you do after that?
A. We waited for the Dormans, and the
Dormans came down and said, "We will have
to call the Union''.
Q. To do what, sir?
A. "Call the Union".
And he called the Union and, I guess,
he didn't get no result, so Art, the senior
truck driver, asked Mr. Dorman if he could
speak to the shop steward, and he said,
''Sure''.
He called the shop steward Harry, and
Art asked them "Could you fellows unload
the cheese?"
Art said, "No, we can't, the Union won't
let us."
Q. What happened after that, sir?
14
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A. We left and put the cheese in storage. (Tr. 152).
This driver took another load in to Dormans on
October 31, 1955. The foHowing occurred:
Q. What happened when you got to the
Dorman docks October 31st?
A. Just as I started to back in, this
fellow rolled out a sign and started picketing,
a colored man, I don't know his name.
Q. Do you recall where he came from?
A. No I don't.
Q. Do you recall what he had on the
sign when he came out and started picketing
the truck?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Was that truck subsequently unloaded?
A. It was unloaded by Dormans and
myself and a couple of the Dorman's boys.
Q. Do you know whether or not there
was any court proceeding going on in New
York at that time concerning this matter?
A. Yes, there was. ('Tr. 153).
Arthur Gywellskog was the second driver on
the Dairy Distributor truck that arrived at Dormans on September 7, 1955. He corroborated the
testimony of the preceding witness, Fredrico, as to
the occurrances of that day. On cross examination
this witness detailed the "back haul" operation of
Dairy Distributors fTr. 156-168).
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Jack Pearce, District Manager of Cache Val'ley
Dairy Association, a witness for plaintiff, testified
as to the Union activities directed against the Association in 'Southern Idaho (Tr. 42-47).
Ross Thoresen, witness for the plaintiff, was
a labor relations counsel employed by Cache Valley
Dairy Association in 1952 (Tr. 177). He was never
employed by Dairy Distributors (Tr. 177). The
witness testified that in July of 1953 the Union
suspended the employees of Cache Valley Dairy Association through an open letter written by Mr.
Rash ('Tr. 180). The basis for the suspension was
because they (the employees) did not fight for a
contract the Union wanted (Tr. 180). After that
the witness ceased to bargain with Mr. Rash (Tr.
180). The witness testified on further direct examination as follows:
Q. Directing your attention to October
31st of 1955, were you in New York City at
that time?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Whi1e you were there, did you have
a conversation with Mr. Ballew?
A. , Yes sir.
Q. Or Mr. Rash?
A. Not Mr. Rash, just Mr. Ballew.
Q. Who was present at the time this
conversation took place?
16
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A. There may have been others, there
could have been others, but my recollection
is it was just Mr. Ballew and myself.
Q. Where did the conversation take
place?
A. In the ·Courthouse there, I think it is
the Federal Courthouse.
Q. What did you say to him and what
did he say to you?
A. I think I asked him about the picketing that ha:d taken place that morning at the
Dormans, this was October 31st, and Mr.
Ballew indicated to me that after - (Tr.
312).

*

* *

Q. (By Hanson) . Confine the conversa tion, Mr. Thoresen, to the actual picketing
going on there if that was the subject of it.
A. We were discussing the picketing,
yes.
Q. Go ahead.
A. Mr. Ballew said they wou1d picket
us whenever they felt like it.
Q. Did he say where they would picket
you?
A. I don't remember he expressed any
particular place they would picket us.
Q. was that the sum and substance of
the conversation?
A. Yes. fTr. 184).
The witness further testified as to a meeting
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held at the Ben Lomond in Ogden, Utah on August
10, 19'55. He stated that the Union had not at that
time been certified as the bargaining agent for the
employees of Cache Val1ey Dairy Association (Tr.
215). Also:
During this meeting for the first time
the Union asked us to include the employees
of Dairy Distributors under a contract and
I advised them we couldn't include them in the
same contract because in our opinion there
were two different companies and there would
have to be two spearate contracts, and one
of them said that would be all right if we
would agree to it but that the drivers had to
be covered with contract too. To my recollection in the three or four years I have been
associated with the Union I never recall them
having made that request to us before. (Tr.
186, 187).
Edwin Gossner was recalled as a witness for
the plaintiff and testified as to the suitability of
Dairy Distributors' equipment for the transportation of cheese (Tr. 203-209).
Arnie Hansen was recalled on cross examination by the defendants with respect to Dairy Distributors' books (Tr. 209-229). The testimony of this
witness has been hereinabove referred to.
First witness for the defense was one LeRoy
Schenk. This witness drove the Dairy Distributors'
truck which arrived at Dormans on July 26, 1955.
18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The witness testified as to the events surrounding
the picketing and as to the unloading of the truck
on July 27, 1955 (Tr. 233-246). There was testimony of a conversation between this witness and
Gossner in the latter's office sometime in April of
1955 CTr. 239-240). This had to do with a cutdown of expenses at that time by reduction of the
number of drivers employed by Dairy Distributors
(Tr. 241).
Milo Rash having theretofore testified was
called as a witness for the defense. iThis witness
testified now as to his conversation with Pierce
in Idaho; ( 2) as to the meeting at the Ben Lomond
Hotel on August 10, 1955; (3) as to the proposed
contract with Cache Valley Dairy Association (the
witness admitted that this contract did not cover
Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 252)); ( 4) as to the meeting on December 6, 1955 in Mr. Thoresen's office
with Mr. Skolnick of the National Labor Relations
Board and others; ( 5) and, as to the May 31, 1955,
and July, 1955 trips to New York, including the
pick~ting activities ( Tr. 246-261).
The defense published the deposition of Victor
Dorman. The recorded testimony of this witness
shows clearly that the object of the Union was the
Cache Valley Dairy Association and that the purpose of the picketing was to force that Association
to negotiate with the Union (Tr. 264-301). With
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reference to a meeting with Mr. Ristuccia in the
latter's office in New York, the witness testified:
Q. On the occasion about which you a~e
testifying, when you talked to Mr. Rash In
Mr. Ristuccia's office with your brother,
what, if anything, was said about picketing
your establishment?
MR. BECK: I object to the form of the
question.
THE COUR'T: The objection is overruled.
A. They said they would picket our estaHlishmen t and they showed us a picket sign
or a replica of a picket sign, I believe Mr.
Rash actually wrote out what would be on a
picket sign if we did not cooperate.
At that time my brother asked them if
that were legal, and his answer was that he
would take his chances upon that.
Q. By cooperation in getting Cache Valley Dairy Association to comply, what did
they mean, do you know? What did it mean
to you when they said, will you cooperate?
A. They would like them to join the
union. ('Tr. 272).

Joseph W. BaUew was recalled as a witness for
the defense. 'The witness testified further as to his
actions in beha1f of the Union both in New York
and in Utah. It is clear from the reading of his
testimony that the primary purpose of the Union
was to renew their contract with the Cache Valley
20
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Dairymens Association by any available means (Tr.
302-321). The witness testified in part:

Q. It is your contention, isn't it Mr.
Ballew, you represented those employes at
the Cache Valley Plant?
A. Yes.
Q. If you represented them why didn't
you call them out in strike?
A. I have been only involved in one
strike in four and a half years.
Q. That isn't the question.
Why didn't you carl them out on strike
if you represented them?
A. You can't do things like that
Q. Can't you call out strikes?
A. Yes, but I don't advocate strikes.
Q. You had one up there?
A. Who?
Q. You?
A. Not me.
Q. Do you know whether a strike was
held up there?
A. In 1952 I heard there was a strike.
Q. Mr. Ballew, you were here among
other things to help Mr. Rash and others deal
with this situation in Cache Valley?
A. Yes.
Q. That would be one way to take care
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of the things, call out a strike and close the
plant down?
A. ·That wasn't my intention.
Q. You went to New York and had
Dormans picket Gassner?
A. That wasn't a strike.
Q. I am not asking whether it was a
strike, it is your method of handling your
problem up there?
A. You may consider it that, I don't.
Q. And a primary strike against an
emp1oyer is not one of the methods you attempted?
A. I have never done it.
Q. Does your Union?
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't know whether the Teamsters ever cal'l strikes against primary employers?
A. Certainly they do.
Q. 'That is what I thought You didn't attempt in 1955 to call Cache
Valley Dairy out on strike, to get Mr. Gassner
to do what you wanted?
A. No. (Tr. 312-314).
'The witness admitted that there were unfair
h1bor charges against the Union in September of
19'55 (Tr. 450). Because of such pending charges
the Union could not ask for a representation election. (Tr. 318).
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LeRoy Schenk was recalled as a witness for
the defendants (Tr. 321). The witness testified
as to the condition of the cheese transported by
Dairy Distributors upon arrival in New York he stated that over a period of near'ly four years,
1952-1955, there were about a dozen tin1es he
had complaints about the cheese being warm CTr.
328).
Clarence Lott, Secretary-Treasurer, Teamsters
Local 983, of Pocate'llo, Idaho, witness for the defense ( Tr. 329). By this witness the defense offered
to show wages paid ~to employees in cheese factories
operating in Idaho and northern Utah. The Court
sustained plaintiff's dbjection to such testimony
(Tr. 329-334).
The deposition of Louis Dorman was published
and the following excerpts therefrom read into
the record:

Q. Suppose a load of cheese showed up
this afternoon at your docks from Smithfield,
Utah, the Cache Valley plant, either by Dairy
Distributors, common carrier truck, or rail,
you would accept it, would you not?
A.

Yes sir. (Tr. 336..:337).

That for ithe defendants; 'the following for the
Plaintiff:
A. Mr. Ristuccia called me in his office and there he introduced me to Mr. Rash
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and Mr. Ballew and they laid the entire story
before me, that Gossner was not cooperat~ng
with them at their end and they would hke
for us not to take cheese.
Q. By "their end", you mean in Smithfield, Utah?
A. Yes, sir. Mr. Ballew and Mr. Rash
and Mr. Ristuccia all joined in the conversation, pointing out to me why I shouldn't accept the cheese, and I explained to them that
I certainly would be cooperative in this thing
if it was of minor importance, but inasmuch
as it was of so great importance to us, that
we depended so much on it, I couldn't very
well just lie down and refuse to take the
cheese.
Q. Did they then say that if you continue to receive cheese that they would picket
your establishment?
A. Yes, Mr. Ristuccia told me that
there was some understanding between different loca:ls, and one tries to coopera;te with
another. And he feels that he should cooperate with this western local. And I would just
have to refuse to take the cheese.
I told him and explained that I wouldn't
do that, I just couldn't take that lying down,
and I had to have that and we would go
through with it.
Mr. Ristuccia told me that he would picket and showed me the sign of the picket, and
we went and talked and talked, and we left
it at that.
Q. After that conversation occurred,
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when this truck appeared then, you were picketed, pickets appeared?
A. Yes, sir. It was Mr. Rash by himself at first. (Tr. 3'37-338).
ARGUMENT
POIN'T I.
DEFENDANTS WERE CLEARLY IN VIOLATION
OF TITLE 29, SECTION 187, LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT AND MUST THEREFORE RESPOND
IN DAMAGES AS THE ACT PROVIDES.

Apperlants correctly assume that respondent
relies upon Section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, more correctly designated as Title
29, Section 187, U.S.C.A. which provides:
"(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting commerce, for any labor
organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their emp'loyment to use, manufacure, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
·commodities or to perform any services, where
an object thereof is" ('1) forcing or requiring any employer or se1f-employed person to join any labor
or employer organization or any employer or
other person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person;
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" ( 2) forcing or requiring any other
employer to recognize or bargain with a_ labor
organization as the representativ~ of _his employees unless such labor organization has
'been certified as the represen1tative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159
of this ti ~le;
"(b) Whoever shall be injured in his
business or property by reason or any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue
therefor in any district court of the United
'States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any
other court having the jurisdiction of the
parties, and shall recover the damages by him
sustained and the cost of the suit. June 23,
1947, 3:17 p.m., E.D.T., c. 120, Title III,
§ 303, 61 Stat. 158."
Appellants admit in their brief the "pursuance
of the object described" in (a) ( 1) above; deny the
object proscribed in (a) ( 2) ; and, deny there was
an "appeal by the Un'ion to induce to concerted action a neutral employee." (Brief of Appellants, 4649).
One activity which respondent contends was
illegal on the part of appellants was to induce and
encourage the employees of N. Dorman and Son to
engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their
emp~oyment to handle cheese received from Dairy
Distributors, Inc. It is further contended by respondent that this conduct and the resultant concert26
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ed refusal of Dorman's employees to handle cheese
from Dairy Distr1butors was done with two objects
or purposes which are specifically set forth in Title
29, Section 187, U. S. C. A. 'The first of these is
forcing any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handl'ing, transporting or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer, processor or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person. Sec 187 (a) (1). That such was one
of the precise reasons for appellants' conduct is
made clear by the testimony of both wi:tnesses, Ballew and Rash.
Rash testified:
Our purpose in going to New York was
to talk to Mr. Dorman and try to get him :to
put pressure on Mr. Gossner with us and, of
course, the question to cover the employees of
Cache Valley. (Tr. 114).
Ballew testified:
Q. The purpose in contacting Mr. Dorman was to prevail upon him to buy cheese
from someone else other than Dairy Dis:tributors or Cache Valley Dairy * * *?

A. Yes, and we also ask if he could persuade Mr. Gossner to meet and bargain with
us.
Q. You had two points in view: One,
to buy cheese at some other place and two,
to meet Mr. Gossner and have him bargain
with you?
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A.

Yes sir. ('Tr. 143).

And,
* * * our purpose was to invoke the relationship of Mr. Dorman to get through to Mr.
Gassner if he could meet with us and we also
' on Mr. Dorman, if that were Im.
prevailed
possible, if he could duplicate his supply of
that cheese from some other source. (Tr.
302).
The deposition of Victor Dorman shows:
Q. Will you state whether any suggestions were made* * *as to what you could do
to get Cache Valley Dairy to coopera,te?
A. They had suggested from the very
start that we get our supplies elsewhere, look
for another shipper. (Tr. 271, 272).
The deposition of Louis Dorman shows:
A. Mr. R'istuccia called me in his office and there he introduced me to Mr. Rash
and Mr. Ballew and they laid the entire story
before me, that Gassner was not cooperating
with them at their end and they would like
for us not to take cheese.
Q. By "their end", you mean in Smithfield, Utah?
A. Yes, sir. Mr. Ballew and Mr. Rash
and Mr. Ristuccia all joined in the conversation, pointing out to me why I shouldn't accept the cheese, and I explained to them that
I certainly would be cooperative in this thing
if it was of minor importance, but inasmuch
as it was of so great importance to us, that
we depended so much on it, I couldn't very
well just lie down and refuse to take the
cheese. (Tr. 337).
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Appellants do not deny this object (to have
Dorman cease doing business with Cache Valley
Dairymens Association), but contend that the means
used was lawful because the Union contacted only
the two Dormans and one Harry Rosen Who said he
was a "foreman" and that he "supervised" the loading and unrloading of merchandise. Appellants contend that Rosen as a "supervisor" was not an "employee" under the act. The act defines an "employee", Title 29, Sec. 152 (3) and a "supervisor",
Title 29, Sec. 152 (11). 'There is no definition of
a "foreman." Respondent respectfulily contends that
something more than the record discloses would be
necessary to classify Rosen as a "supervisor" within the meaning of the act. It has been 'held:
"'This chapter does not except foremen
* * *." N.L.R.B. v. Skinner and Kennedy Stationary Co., (C.C.A. 1940), 113 F. (2) 667.
Respondent's cause, however, is not predicated
upon the status of Rosen within the Act.
Appellants inadvertently om'it from their
statement of the case and from their argument the
testimony of respondent's witnesses Fredrico and
Gywellskog ( Tr. 151-171). These were the drivers
on the Dairy Distributors, Inc. truck that transpo~ted the cheese to the Dormans in New York.
Their testimony makes it crystal clear that Dorman's employees refused to unload the cheese and
that these refusals extended in time from July 26,
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1955, through September 7, 1955. Further, Victor
Dorman told Gassner ~that:
"Our employees don't want to unload
any more Dairy Distributors' cheese, don't
send any more with Dairy Distributors'
trucks." ( Tr. 89) .

'There was a concerted refusai on the part of
Dorman's employees to handle Cache Valley Dairy
Association cheese; and, the employees were induced
by what? The picketing efforts of Rash and Ballew, nothing else, because the Dormans wanted the
cheese and had never told their employees not to
unload it ( Tr. 272, 273).
'The appellants must respond in damages to
respondent for violation of Title 29, Section 187
(a) (1) of the Act.
'The second announced purpose of the appellants was to force Gassner as Manager of Cache
Valley Dairymens Association to recognize and bargain With the Loca:l Union in Ogden as the represen ta tive of his employees ( Tr. 11-1) . This they
could not lawfully do unless they had been certified
as the representative of such employees under the
provisions of Section 159 of the Act. (Title 29, Sec.
187, (a) ( )3). Rash testified unequivocally that
when he and Ballew went to New York on May 31,
1955, Local Union 9'76 had not been certified by the
National Labor Re1ations Board as representative
30
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of the employees of Cache Valley Dairymens Association ('Tr. 118, 119). But, appel'lants argue, it was
the Union's "understanding" that they represented
the association employees. (Appellant's Brief 5257). This appellants contend even in spiite of the
fact that the Union had suspended these very same
em.ployees by an open letter in July of 1953 (Tr.
180) and that for about two years thereafter the
Union made no demands (Tr. 189).
Appellants' contention is that the Un'ion did
nothing violative of Section 187 (a) {2) of the Act
because "* * * the Union enjoyed a position of similar standing to that of being certified * * *." (Appellant's Brief, 58). The act itself, Section 187
(a) ( 3), provides for no such excep:tion. It would
be a strange rule of law if a Union which once upon
a time represented a group of employees under a
contract which 'had expired would be permitted to
suspend those employees from the Union and be
permitted to claim representation and "enjoy the
status of the bargaining agent" solely because an
employee, an employer or another Union had not
petitioned for representation in accordance with
Section 159 (C) {1) (A) and (B) for which appellants contend. For :the purpose of the picketing
in New York, the Union clearly pointed out in their
picket signs that the Cache Valley Da'irymens Association employees at Smithfield, Utah, were NON31
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UNION EMPLOYEES. Would the Union make
these same employees fish for one purpose, fowl
for another?
Can these appellants, from the state of the
record, successfully claim here and i(J;llege that a substantial number of Cache Valley Dairy Association
employees wished to be represented for collective
bargaining by Local 976 during the period of this
controversy? If the answer to that question is "no",
then the Union must respond in damages for a
violation of Section 187 (a) (2) of the Act.
Finally, under Point I of appellants' argument,
they con tend :
"Even if the picketing had induced Dorman's employees to engage in a concerted refusal to handle the cheese, (as it did) defendants claim their traditional right to picket
an ambulatory situs of their dispute with
Gassner* * *." (Appellants' Brief, p. 63, 64).
'This argument appears to be fallacious for if
appelilants can, as they say, violate the law with
impunity, the law 'itself becomes a nul'lity. The law
does not sanction picketing for an unlawful purpose. Sloan v. Journal Publishing Company, (Ore.
19'58) 324 P. (2) 449.
In support of this final contention your appellants cite N.L.R.B. v. International Rice llfilling Co.,
341 U.S. 665, 95 L. Ed. 1277, 71 S. Ct. 961. This
case holds that where agents of a union who pic32
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keted a n1i'll encouraged two men in charge of a
truck of a neutral customer of the mill to refuse,
in the course of their employment, to go to the mill
for an order of goods, such conduct did not constitute an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
the secondary boycott provisions. The union was
there picketing the primary employer at his place
of business and by no stretch of the imagination
can that case he pertinent to the facts of the cause
at bar.
Appellants rely also upon the National Labor
Relations Board's Schultz Refrigerated Service case,
25 LRRM 1122, ruling, and we respectfully point
out in that case tha:t, first, the picketing was Emiited in time and area to the primary employer's
trucks; second, the employees involved in the labor
dispute were employed by the prim,ary employer to
drive its trucks only in New York City; third, the
employer at the time of the picketing was engaged
in its normal business of transporting goods in that
city; fourth, there was no other place in the city
where the union could give adequate notice of its
dispute with the primary employer; and fifth, there
is no complaint of interference with :the business of
secondary employers.
One important test of 1awfulness of a union's
picketing activities in the course of its dispute with
an employer is the identificaJtion of such picketing
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with the actual functioning of the primary employer's business at the situs of the labor dispute.
In the case appellants refer to as the Campbell
Coal case (Sales Drivers, Helpers and Building Construction Drivers, Local Union 859, of International Br.'Jtherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL, Petitioner
v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent,
229 F. (2) 514, 37 L.R.R.M. 2166) it will be noted
that the case involved picketing at the sites shared
by the struck employer and neutral employers. Our
cause involves the picketing of Dairy Distributors'
truck at the neutral employer's place of business
to compel the primary employer, Cache Valley
Dairymens Association to deal with the non-certified union.
N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, etc., 191
F. (2) 65, also relied upon by appellants, in fact
holds:
"The Union dearly violated the Act in
picketing the Read Warehouse. For no trucks
operated by the primary employer were present at the warehouse, nor were any of its
employees there engaged in the primary emp'loyer's business. The Board's findings, amply
supported by the evidence, make it plain that,
by this picketing, the Union induced Read's
warehouse employees to engage in a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to
perform their customary services - i.e., to
quit work - and that they did quit, in part
at least, because they were so induced by this
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picketing. The Board was also clearly right
in concluding that the objects of the Union's
inducement were those prescribed by (a) and
(b) of § 8 (b) ( 4) - namely, to force Read
to cease doing business with the primary employer and to force the primary employer to
recognize the Union as the representative of
its employees, although the Union had not
been certified as such a representative. 'To
that extent, therefore, the Board's decision
was correct and wirl now be enforced."
Appellants also misconstrue the rule of the
Moore Dry Dock case (Sailors Union of the Pacific,
27 LLRM 1108). Appellants with reference to this
case state:
"2. 'At the time of the picketing the
primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the situs.' When the Gossner truck
was in front of Dorman's and being picketed,
Gossner's employee was there too, and in fact
did, engage in Gossner' s normal business of
unloading cheese at that point. There is no
evidence to the contrary."
But, under the facts of this cause, it is clear
that Dairy Distributors, Inc. was not the primary
employer at the situs or at all and, also, that the
picketing clearly discloses (from the signs themselves) that the dispute was clearly not with Dairy
Distributors, Inc. but with the primary emplloyer
Cache Valley Dairymens Association. We find no
solace for appellants' cause in the authorities they
cite.
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The cases appellants cite to the court are exceptions to the general rule that picketing at the premises of secondary employers are violations of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) are limited to the situation
where the primary employer has no separate premises in the area of the labor dispute which affords
the union an outlet for its primary activity. The
rationa le behind these exceptions is that unless the
union w 2re permitted to carry its primary dispute
to the neutral premises in these circumstances, its
right to engage in primary activity would be virtually obliterated.
1

No sue~ justification for embroiling Dorman
in respondents' dispute with Cache Valley Dairymens Association exists here for Cache Valley Dairymens Association has a regular place of business
where the labor dispute is located, at which respondents can engage in primary picketing. Thus, respondents are unions which are located in, and whose
jurisdiction is Utah; their labor dispute with Cache
Valley Dairymens Association invo'lves employees
who are hired in Utah; the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees in question are fixed
in Utah; and the services of said employees are entirely performed in Utah. Moreover, as testified
by 1the witness Thoresen, Cache Valley Dairymens
Association has a regular plant and place of business in Utah where respondents can engage in pri36
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mary picketing (and where such picketing has in
the past effectively affected the ingress and egress
of the trucks of four large common carriers doing
business with Cache Val'ley Dairymens Association). Thus, the situs of the dispute in this case is
clearly located in Utah. This fact is a1so demonstrated by the language on the several picket signs
which were carried by respondents at Dorman's
premises.
Clearly, therefore, the facts of this case are
distinguishable from the Schultz case, supra, where
the dispute involved a New York union over deliveries in New York and where there was no place
in New York other than the trucks of the primary
employer which the Union could picket. It is also
clearly distinguishable from the Moore Dry Dock
case, supra, where the picketing union had no other
place in lthe United States to picket. Here, the disputing union has moved its picketing 2,200 miles
from the situs of its dispute and from the area of
its own jurisdiction, although it has adequate facilities for primary picketing in the area where the
dispute exists, and although it was unnecessary for
it to do so in order to adequately appeal to the employees of Cache Valley Dairymens Association. As
the Court of Appeals for :the Se'cond Circuit said in
its very recent decision (November 3, 1955) in
N.L.R.B. v. Associated Musicians of Greater New
York et al., (Docket No. 23550) :
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"It was clearly not necessary for the
respondent union to picket the common premises in order to reach the other employees
of the primary employer. At most three of
these other employees worked at the common
premises * * * wh:Ile some sixty-five (primary) employees were emp loyed at the studio
of WIN'S (the primary premises) , which respondent union was picketing. Furthermore,
·the few (primary) employees who ever went
to the common premises spent a portion of
their time at WINS and hence could be reached by picketing there."
1

The Court concluded that the picketing of the
common premises therefore violated Section 8 (b)
( 4) (A). IT he Second Circuit's decision in the Assoc~ated Musicians case, supra, was an acceptance by
the Court of the principle enunciated by the Board
in Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107
NLRB 299, and in other cases subsequent to Schultz
and Moore Dry Dock which hold that common situs
picketing cannot he engaged in where the prin1ary
employer has a regular place of business in the area
of the labor dispute at which the picketing union
can engage in primary picketing. The Board's Washington Coca Cola decision was approved and enforced
by the Court of Appeals in Brelcety and Beverage
Workers Drivers v. N.L.R.B., 220 F. (2) 380
(C.A. 4).
'The most recent ruling to come to our attention, N.L.R.B. v. United Steel TVorkeJ's, Dec. 5,
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1957, 1st Circuit, 250 F. (2) 184, is completely in
accord with the foregoing authorities. There the
court wrote:
"The Board on exceptions filed by the
Union agreed with the ultimate conclusion
reached by the trial examiner but not with his
reason therefor. Relying for its authority upon
Brewery Drivers and Workers etc. (Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.) , 107
N.L.R.B. 299, 302-303, enforced sub nom.
Brew·ery and Beverage Drivers and Workers,
etc. v. N.L.R.B., 1955, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 117,
220 F. 2d 380; Local 657, International Brotherhood of 'Teamsters etc. (Southwestern
Motor Transport, Inc.), 115 N.L.R.B. No.
155; and Sheet Metal Workers International
Association Local No. 51 ( W. H. Arthur) ,
115 N.L.R.B. No. 183, it said:
" 'We agree with the 'Trial Examiner
that the Respondents violated Section 8 (b)
( 4) (A) of the Act by picketing the trucks of
Barry, with whom the respondents had a 'labor
dispute, at the termina ls and the packaging
plant of secondary employers on April 25,
1956. In so doing however, we, unlike the
Trial Examiner, do not rely upon the Respondents' alleged failure to observe the Moore
Dry Dock requirement that the picketing at
_the secondary employers' premises be conducted in a manner clearly disclosing :that it
was directed only against the primary employer. Apart from the fact that we believe
that the Trial Examiner's finding that the
Moore Dry Dock standard was not met is factually incorrect, the Board has he ld that the
Moore Dry Dock doctrine is inapplicable to a
1

1
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situation where as here the primary emplo:yer
has a permanent place of business at wh1ch
the union could adequately publicize its labor
dispute. In these circumstances, we find, in accordance with the reasoning in Washington
Coca Cola and Southwestern cases, that the
fact that the picketing was conducted at the
premises of secondary employers, plainly reveals that it was designed, at least in part,
to induce and encourage the employees of
these secondary employers to engage in a concer:ted refusal in the course of their employment to handle Barry's freight with an object of forcing or requiring the secondary
em p1oyers to disc on tin ue doing business with
Barry and that the Respondents thereby violated Section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) of the Act.'
"We agree with the Board that the Moore
Dry Dock doctrine, so-called, has no application to the situation disclosed by the facts in
this case.
"That doctrine was devised by the Board
to reconcile 'the dual congressional objectives
of preserving the right of labor organizations
to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of
shielding unoffending employers and others
from pressures in controversies not their own.'
N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council, 1951, 341 U.S. 675, 692, 71
S. Ct. 943, 9'53, 95 L. Ed. 1284. To effect this
reconciliation the Board held as foHows (footnotes omitted) in a case involving the
picketing of a vessel of a primary employer tied up at a secondary employer's drydock:
" 'When a secondary employer is harborin the situs of a dispute between a union and
40
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a primary employer, the right of neither the
union to picket nor of the secondary employer
to be free from picketing can be absolute. The
enmeshing of premises and situs qualifies both
rights. In the kind of situation that exists in
this case, we believe that picketing of the premises of a secondary employer is primary if
it meets the following conditions: (a) The
picketing is strictly limited to times when
the situs of dispute is located on the secondary
emp loyer's premises: (b) at the time of the
picketing the primary employer is engaged
in its normal business at the situs; (c) the
picketing is limited to places reasonably close
to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with
the primary employer.'
1

"We may concede that the Moore Dry
Dock doctrine would have application when
the primary employer has a fixed and permanent place of business, but picketing his
premises by striking employees would not in
any real sense adequately publicize the labor
dispute. 'The Board clearly recognized this in
the language quoted above from its decision
in the case at bar, such, apparent1y, was the
situation in N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffers, etc., 2 Cir., 1951, 191 F. 2d 65, and it is
frequently the situation in the building construction industry Where more often than not
most of the employees of a contractor or subcontractor are working at a building site with
employees of other employers and seldom, or
only very briefly, have occasion to visit their
employer's yard, warehouse, office or other
headquarters. See N.L.R.B. v. General Drivers, etc., 5 Cir., 1955, 225 F. 2d 205; Sales
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Drivers, etc. v. N.L.R.B., 1955, 97 U.S. App.
D.C. 173, 229 F. 2d 514, and its sequel Truck
Drivers and He1pers Local, etc., v. N.L.R.B.,
D.C. Cir., 249 F. 2d 512.
"The case at bar, hovrever, does not present the foregoing situation, for here, so far
as the record shows, all of the employees in
the bargaining unit were continuously employed at Barry's manufacturing plant, except Yorke and perhaps another truck driver
with whom we are not concerned, and Yorke
not only must frequently have had to cross
the picket line at the Barry plant on his way
to and from work, but he also had occasion
in the course of his pickup and delivery duties
to cross the picket line in his truck at least
once or twice a day. Thus by picketing the
premises of the primary employer, Barry,
alone, the Union had a fully adequate opportunity to publicize its 1abor dispute to the
members of the bargaining unit generally and
also to exert individual pressure on Yorke by
embarrassing him into either joining the
strike or quitting his job. Certainly from these
facts it was logical and reasonable for the
Board to draw the inference that the Union's
picketing of Yorke's truck at the premises of
secondary employers must have been designed, in part at least, to encourage those employers to cease doing business with Barry,
or to induce their employees not to handle or
transport Barry's freight. * * *"
On the foregoing authorities, we submit that it
is clearly reasonable to believe that respondents had
and have no right to picket at Dorman's premises
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in New York City and that such picketing is secondary and vidlative of Section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) of the
Act.
POINT II.
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF 'TEAMSTERS
WAS A LABOR ORGANIZATION SUBJECT TO THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT; THE
COURT BELOW HAD JURISDICTION OVER WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL UNION.

Appellants argue in Points II, III, and IV
that no liability could be imposed on the defendant
Western Conference of Teamsters or the International Union because the Western Conference is not
a labor union and no jurisdiction by service of process was obtained over either the Western Conference or the International Union. We will discuss
each of these propositions separately.
In Point II the appellants quote the definition
of a labor organization, which appears in Section
II (5) of the Labor Management R~elations Act,
and Section 152 ( 5) of Title 29, U. S. C. A. and
F.C.A., and claim tha:t by this definition the Western Conference is not a labor organization. The
onily evidence in the record that it is not within the
definition of the statute is the self-serving statement of Joseph Ballew that the Western Conference is not a labor union (Tr. 149). The definition
in the act, however, refers not to a labor union but
a labor organization.
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The definition referred to above says that a
labor organization is "an organization of any kind
or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part
of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
Joseph Ballew testified that he was in Utah
as an employee and representative of the Western
States Dairy Employees Council, a division of the
Western Conference of Teamsters (Tr. 141). Ballew, by his own statement, was in Utah as a represen ta:tive of the Western Conference to assist local
unions "in negotiation of contracts, disputes, or
strikes over employees rights" (Tr. 142). Ballew
also claims he was sent to Utah to assist in those
duties and did assist the local union in Ogden, No.
976 (Tr. 142).
'There can _be no question that Ballew consulted
and advised with local union officials, assisted in
planning, preparation of picketing and the actual
picketing in New York (Tr. 143). It seems clear
that the orgainzation by which he was employed,
the defendant Western Conference of Teamsters,
existed in part a;t least for the purpose of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, and the other matters referred to in the defi44
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nition of a labor organization in Title 29, Sec. 152
(5 ), U.S.C.A. The Court's attention is invited to the
case of International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 8 v. Hawaiian Pineapple Company, et al., a- Ninth Circuit Court decision, found
at 226 F. (2) 875. In that case an action was
brought by the Pineapple Company for damages under the same section of the act which is the basis
of this lawsuit. 'The defendant local and the internationa!l union claimed as a defense that the persons
acting were not acting as agents for either the local
union or the international.
In answer to this contention the decision cites
Sec. 185 (e) of Title 29, as follows:
"For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as
an 'agent' of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the
question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling. (June 23,
1947, c. 120, Title III, #301, 61 Stat. 156) ."
At page 880 of the opinion the following language appears as a construction of this section:
"Probably the practica1 result of the section in the case of labor unions was to restore
the general rules of agency, particularly the
rules of apparent authority which had been
curtarled by the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
#151 et seq. and the decision of United Bro45
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therhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.
Ct. 775, 91 L. Ed. 973. We think the section
was intended to cover the acts of officers of
the union who deal with employers or with
the public. That is, if a union puts or lets
an officer or other representative get into a
position where he can and does cause trouble
proscribed by the act then the union is responsible."
It seems clear that Ballew on behalf of the
Western Conference and for the Western Conference, as part of the International Union, was in
Utah for the specific purpose of helping the local
union and that he did so. The Western Conference,
the local union in Ogden, and the International
Union let its representative get into a position where
he could and did cause trouble of the kind complained of in this lawsuit and therefore, the local,
the Western Conference, and the International are
responsible for his acts under the statute and the
decisions construing it.
Under Point III, the appellants claim that no
jurisdiction over the Western Conference could be
obtained because it maintained no employees, no
payroll, and had no knowledge whatever of the situation which gave r'ise to this lawsuit.
The fact is that by his own statement Ballew
was sent to Utah for the specific purpose of assisting Local 976 in its dispute with the Cache Valley
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Dairy Association (Tr. 142). His employer was the
Western States Dairy Employees Council, a part
of the Western Conference (Tr. 141, 142)-. The Western Conference is by Ballew's assertion part of the
International Union ('Tr. 143, 144).
In Point IV of appellant's brief the same contention is made about the International Union as
for the Western Conference. The same testimony
as to its connection with the activity complained of
here is a pplicalYle.
This same question of jurisdiction was considered in the case of United Mine Workers of America v. Patton, 211 F. (2) 742, a 1954 decision of
the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.
This case was a damage action under the same
section of the Taft-Hartley Act, Sec. 187 of Title 29,
U.S.C.A., as is the basis of this lawsuit, and the
violations claimed by the plaintiff were of sub-sections 1 and 2 of Sec. 187 (a) as in this case.
'The opinion contains the following discussion
of the question here raised by the appellants:
"The chief argument of defendants in
support of their motion for directed verdict
is that there 'is no evidence that they authorized or ratified the strikes upon which plaintiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there
is no evidence of any resolution of either the
United Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or ratifying the strike.s. There is evidence, however, that the strikes were called
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by the Field Represen ta ti ve of the United
Mine Workers, who was employed by District
28, and that he was engaged in the organization work that was being carried on by the
internationa1 union through District 28, which
was a mere division of the international
union. Members of the union are members
of local and district unions as well as the
international ; and of the $4 monthly dues
paid by them, $2 goes to the international
union, $1 to the local union and $1 to the district organization. It is clear that in carrying on organizational work in the field representative is engaged in the business of both
the international union and the district and
that both are responsible for acts done by
him within the scope and course of his employment. Stockwell v. United States, 13 WaJll.
531, 545-548, 20 L. Ed. 491; Hindman v.
First Nat. Bk. of Louisville, 6 Cir., 112 F.
931, 57 L.R.A. 108; Oman v. United States,
10 Cir., 179 F. 2d 738; United States v.
Waters, 7 Cir., 194 F. 2d 866; Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va.
824, 27 S.E. 2d 198; 2 Am. Jur. 279."
In this case the witness Rash testified dues
were paid to the local union and a per capita to the
international union ( Tr. 116) . He further testified
that Ogden Local 976 was in trusteeship; that Jack
Annan of Los Angeles, California was the trustee
appointed by the Executive Board of the International Union ('Tr. 121-12'3).
In the Patton case, the union defendants argued
that they should be exempt from liability because of
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certain previous decisions construing the NorrisLaGuardia Act. The Patton decision points out that
the Taft-Hartley Act adopts a new rule exemplified
by Sec. 185 of Title 29, U.S.C.A. The decision says
as foHows:
''It is clear, however, that the rule as so
interpreted was not adopted by the Labor
Management Relations Act and that its application to suits under that act was expressly
excluded by section 301 (e), 61 Stat. 156, 157,
29 U.S.C.A. #185 (e), which provides:
" 'For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as
an "agent" of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts,
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.'
"'The section of the Act under which this
action is brought, 303 (b), 29 U.S.C.A. # 187
(b), expressly provides that suits thereunder
shall be subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301, 29 U.S.C.A. # 185, as
wili be seen by reference to the section which
is quoted in full above.
"The history of the Act shows clearly
that the intent of Congress was to apply to
suits of this character the common law rules
with respect to liability for acts of an agent."
Based upon an examination of the decisions
construing the statutes here involved the special
section on Agency (Sec. 185, Title 29, U.S.C.A.),
and the testimony of Ballew and Rash, respondent
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submits that jurisdiction of the Western Conference and the International Union was acquired and
they cannot escape responsibility for the acts of
their representatives. Certainly by no stretch of
one's imagination could they be considered "strangers to this action."
POINT III.
'THE CASE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE
JURY, WHICH WAS CORRECTLY AND ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCTED.

Points V, VI, VII and VIII of appellants' brief
raise various questions and the discussion of these
points is 'intended to apply to al1 of them.
Among the matters raised is the admissibility
of books and records of the plaintiff corporation.
The appellants raised no objection when the
records were offered, but said after an examination
of the books and records an objection might be made
(Tr. 68). No such objection was ever thereafter
made and appellants cannot now complain about
their being received as exhibits. They were received
and sent to the jury.
It should be pointed out that this suit was filed
June 29, 1956, and not tried until October 23, 1957.
Appellants made no attempt by subpoena, deposition, or otherwise, to examine the books and records
introduced before the case was tried.
Appellants cite the court to Eureka Hill Mining
Company v. Bullion Beck & Champion Mining Com50
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pany, 32 Utah 236, 90 P. 157, a 1907 Utah case,
as support for the claim that the books are inadmissible as being incompetent evidence.
The quotation from that case which appears in
appellants' brief is from a Referee's Report quoted
by the court. Further, it does not refer to business
records which were admitted in evidence in that
case, but to notations appearing on the original
records. The original records were admitted. The
case simply does not stand for the proposition for
which the appellants cite it.
The admissibility of business records under the
so-called "shop...:book" rule has been the law in this
state for many years.
In Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a 1938 case, 85 P. (2) 819, a discussion of
the rule as applicable to hospital records is set forth
and says the following:
We recogn'ize that the practice at common law in requiring the presence in court of
the writer, or the identification of his handwriting, of each piece of writing, figure or
notation introduced 'in evidence was too strict.
·The shop-book rule, permitting the introduction of books of original en try made in the
usual course of business and introduced from
proper custody and upon general authentication, was a wise liberalization. This court
has recogn'ized the shop-book rule. Welsh,
Driscoll & Buck v. Buck, 64 Utah 579, 585,
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232 P. 911; Utah Commercial & Savings Bank
v. Fox, 44 Utah 323, 140 P. 660; Walker Bros.
v. Sldiris, 34 Utah 353, 361, 98 P. 114; Ogden
Packing & Provision Co. v. Tooele Meat &
Storage Co., 41 Utah 92, 124 P. 333."
This court has recognized and adopted in addition to the "shop-book rule" the "regular entry
rule." In State v. Davie, 240 P. (2) 265, the opinion
by Mr. Justice McDonough says:
"The records referred to were properly
identified by employees or attendants in the
several offices as records kept in the regular
course of business. While these records, as
used in this case, do not, strictly speaking,
fall within the 'shop book rule', they are admissible for the same reasons which gave rise
to that rule which has long since had the approval of this court. See cases listed in OlaytOn
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 96
Utah 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 120 A.L.R. 1117.
They were correctly admitted in evidence under what is called 'the regular entry rule.'
32 C.J.S., Evidence, #683B, p. 554, states:
'In addition to the shopbook rule, another very
generally established rule, adopted by statute
in some jurisdictions and sometimes spoken
of as "the regular entry rule," is that regular
entries made in the course of business * * *
are admissilJle in evidence when a proper
foundation is laid.' It is no longer necessary
to have the person who made the records identify them. If he cannot be obtained as a witness, other employees who know the facts can
do so. See 3'2 C.J.S., p. 554 referred to above;
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1070. It is the
prerogative of the trial court to determine
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when such foundation is laid and sufficient
showing of the credibility of the evidence is
established. This requirement was met in the
instant case."
The business records introduced for the respondent were properly identified by the witness Hansen,
who made the entries. A proper foundation was laid
to bring them within the "shop-book rule" or the
"regular entry rule" (Tr. 64, 65, 66), and the trial
judge was correct in receiving the exhibits offered.
In the discussions under Points V, VI, VII and
VIII, the appellants refer to Instruction No. 11 and
apparently argue that it correcilly states the law
on the subject. With this contention the respondents agree and respondents also agree that in the
absence of objection such an 'instruction becomes
the law of the case. The submission of this instruction cannot possibly have prejudiced the appellants.
'The claim is made by appellants that the proof
is not sufficient to sustain the damages awarded
because it permitted a result based upon speculation. In support of this they refer to United States
v. Griffith, et al, 210 Fed (2) 11. In this case the
Tenth Circuit Court disallowed a judgment for loss
of profits because of failure of the evidence to support the judgment. However, the only evidence of
loss of profits was the oral statement of the president of the plaintiff and no books or records were
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ever produced. This case is certainly not authority
for the proposition that lost profits cannot be recovered if proper evidence of such loss is introduced.
The respondent contends that adequate and
competent evidence was introduced in this case to
sustain the verdict and the judgment thereon, and
that the verdict was not based upon speculation or
guess work.
The question of recovery for loss of profits in
the future was discussed in the case of United Mine
Workers v. Patton, 211 Fed. (2) 742, which has
been referred to earlier. The Patton case was an
action for damages under the section of the TaftHartley Act, the same section that is the basis for
this action. In that case the plaintiffs acquired coal
min'ing equipment and secured a lease on mining
property from the Clinchfield Coal Company and
conducted mining operations. The lease was later
cancelled pursuant to its terms and the court inferred because the union was attempting to make
the plaintiff and other lessees employ union labor.
The plaintiffs were tdld that they could renew the
lease and thereafter could operate either with union
or non-union employees. They began operations
again on a non-union basis and were shut down because of a strike against Clinchfield and the strike
against Clinchfield was the basis of the suit. The
three year renewal lease was signed by Clinchfield
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but vvas never actually delivered to the plaintiffs.
The defendant union argued that no proper evidence of loss of profits was submitted and that the
judgment awarded plaintiff of $150,000.00 was
speculative. With respect to this contention the court
says at page 745 of the opinion as follows:
"On the question of damages the evidence is that plaintiffs purchased the equipment of Moore for $25,000 paying only $10,000 in cash and the remainder on a tonnage
basis as their mining operations went forward. From March 1949 to March 1950 they
returned net income as a result of the operations of approximately $47,000 and contend
that the actual profits were in excess of $60,000. They introduced a witness who estimated
'the profits for the remaining months of the
three year lease at $125,27 4.92, based on the
old operating costs and the current price of
coal, and at $2'3'2,289.6'2, based upon reduced
cost of operations considered possible.
"On these facts we think that the case
was one for the jury under Sec. 303 (b) of
'the Labor Management Relations Act, 61
Sta:t. 158, 159, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 187 (b)."
Later in the opinion the court refers to the question of speculation as to damages and says the following quoting Story Parchment Company v. Paterson Parchment Paper Company, a U. S. Supreme
Court case:
"Another argument is that no damage
has been shown because it is said that the
55
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three year lease had not been delivered and
future profits of the business which p'laintiffs
were forced to abandon were purely speculative. We think however, that the evidence sufficiently showed that plaintiffs had established a profitable business under the arrangement they had with Clinchfield, and that
irrespective of the three year lease a sufficient basis had been laid for an award of damages. As said by the Supreme Court in Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S. Ct. 248, 250,
75 L. Ed. 544, a tort case arising under the
Sherman Act:
'' 'Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it wou1d
be a perversion of fundamental principles of
justice to deny all relief to the injured person; and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from
making any amend for his acts. In such case,
while the damages may not be determined by
mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if
the evidence show the extent of the damages
as a matter of just and reasonable inference,
although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that
they cannot be measured with the exactness
and precision that would be possible if the
case, which he a!lone is responsible for making,
were otherwise.'
''1See also Bieglow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U. S. 251, 66 S. Ct. 574, 90
L. Ed. 652, and Polar Steamship Corp. v. Inland Overseas Steamship Corp., 4 Cir., 136
F. 2d 835."
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It is the position of the respondents that there
was am p'le competent evidence on which the question of loss of future profits should have been submitted to the jury and that the verdict returned
was not based upon conjecture or speculation or
guess work.
)The claim is made by appellants that no damages could be recovered by respondent because he
did not have a contract with the Cache Valley Dairy
Association to buy, nor a contract with N. Dorman
and Sons by which they agreed to purchase any
particular amount of product from the respondent.
There is no merit in this contention. No case
has been found nor any rule of law which restricts
recovery for loss of profits either in an action under
the Taft-Hartjley Act or otherwise to those cases
in which a contract is involved.
Nothing in this record even suggests that the
respondent would not have had a continuing source
of supply. His source was one of the largest swiss
cheese manufacturing plants in America.
The record shows that the President of the
respondent had been doing business with N. Dorman
and Sons since 1946, and had conducted a growing
volume of business with that company (Tr. 9).
Victor Dorman testified that respondent was
supplying 50 7o of the swiss cheese handled by his
company (Tr. 277).
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Louis Dorman testified that respondent was
an important source of supply and he could not take
the union's insistance that he find other sources
"lying down." His statement is as follows:
"A. Yes sir. Mr. Ballew and Mr. Rash
and Mr. Ristuccia all joined in the conversation, pointing out to me why I shouldn't
accept the cheese, and I explained to them
that I certainly would be cooperative in this
thing if it was of minor importance, but inasmuch as it was of so great importance to us,
that we depended so much on it, I couldn't
very wel1 just lie down and refuse to take the
cheese."
The evidence clearly shows that except for the
conduct of the union and its representatives complained of in this action respondent could have continued to do business with N. Dorman and Sons
indefinitely in the same or greater volume.
Appellant claims also that N. Dorman and Sons
didn't stop buying from respondent because of picketing. This just isn't the case. Victor Dorman told
Gossner not to send any more cheese of Dairy Distributors, Inc. because his employees would not unload it. This was told Gossner orally and he was
notified in writing. The following testimony was
given by Gossner under cross-examination by Mr.
Beck:
"Q. Did you make any effort after you
made the decision, or at the time you were

I
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making the decision to stay in business or
to use your equipment, so you wouldn't be
damaged so much, in other words to diminish
your damages?
"A. Well, I think I did. I have tried to
convince the people back there to keep buying
Dairy Distributors cheese, and I was told that
Dorman employees would not unload any more
that was Dairy Distributors cheese.
"Q. Who told you Dormans wouldn't
unload any more Dairy Distributors cheese?
"A. The man I do business with back
there, one of the Dormans said, 'Our emp[oyees don't want to unload any more Dairy Distributors cheese, don't send any more with
Dairy Distributors trucks.'"
N. Dorman and Sons continued to do business
with the Cache Valley Dairy Association, but not
with the respondent Dairy Distributors, Inc.
POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS UNLAWFULLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE AND DEFENDANTS' CONTENTION TO
THE CONT~ARY IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES.

Under-Points IX and X of appellants' brief it
is contended that plaintiff shou1d be denied recovery
because respondent was unlawfully engaged in interstate commerce. This contention is without merit.
Appellants set forth numerous sections of the
Interstate Commerce Act, Title 49, Transportation.
With all of the enumerated sections relied upon by
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appellants we have no quarret Respondent's contention is that he was a "private carrier" as defined
by the Act. A private carrier is defined by the Act
as:
"The term 'private carrier of property by
motor vehicle' means any person not included
in the terms 'common carrier by motor vehicle' or 'contract carrier by motor vehicle',
who or which transports in interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of
wnich such person is the owner, lessee, or
bailee, when such transportation is for the
purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in
furtherance of any commercial enterprise."
(U.S.,C., p. 7180-81, Sec. 303 {17)).
Under the Powers and duties of the Commission, it is declared:
''It shall be the duty of the Commission-

* * *

" ( 3) To establish for private carriers
of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor
is found, reasonalJle requirements to promote
safety of operation, and to that end prescribe
qualifications and maximum hours of service
of employees, and standards of equipment. In
the event such requirements are established,
the term 'motor carrier' shall be construed
to include private carriers of property by
motor vehicle in the administration of subsection (c) of this section and sections 305,
320, 321, 322 (a), (b), (d), (f), and (g),
and 324 of this tifle." (U.S.C., p. 7182, Sec.
304 {3)).

There is nothing shown, proved or indicated
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in the record in this cause to even suggest that the
Commission has or should have exercised its authority so as to invoke the provisions of Section 304 (c)
which provides :
"Upon complaint in writing to the Commission by any person, State board, organization, or body politic, or upon its own initiative without complaint, the Commission may
investigate whether any motor carrier or
broker has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter, or with any requirement
established pursuant thereto. If the Commission, after notice and hearing, finds upon any
such investigation that the motor carrier or
broker has failed to comply with any such provision or requirement, the Commission shall
issue an appropriate order to compel the carrier or broker to comply therewith. Whenever
the Commission is of opinion that any complaint does not state reasonable grounds for
investigation and action on its part, it may
dismiss such complaint." (U.S.C. p. 7183,
Sec. 304 (c)).
Appel1ants do not and cannot contend that they
or anyone else made complaint to the Commission
or that the Commission upon its own initiative complained against respondent for any failure to comply
with any provision of the Transportation Act. For
a lack thereof it must be presumed that your respondent was at no time unlawfully engaged in interstate commerce. The record in fact shows that the
Interstate Commerce Commission was aware of the
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Dairy Distributors' trucking operation. Edwin Goss..
ner testified:
"We have been checked by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the National Labor since the Union put pressure on us the
last few years we have had every agency I
know of check our books and we have come
out pretty clean with the Interstate Commerce Commission too.'' (Tr. 82).
(This testimony was stricken from the record
as not be'ing responsive and the jury instructed to
disregard it, but it is the fact.)
Cases relied upon by appellants, Stickle Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, (lOth Cir.), 128
F. (2) 155; George Truck Systems, Inc. v. Interstate GDmmerce Commission, (5th Cir.) 123 F. (2)
210; Scott v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 213
F. 30, are not determinative of a course of conduct
contended for by appellants which has never been
adjudicated.
POINT V.
DEFENDANTS OFFER NO AUTHORITY FOR
THEIR FURTHER CONTENTIONS, ALL OF WHICH
ARE NOT MERITORIOUS.

Without benefit of authority appellants claim
error on the part of the trial judge for having refused proffered testimony as to wages paid to cheese
workers at cheese factories other than the Cache
Valley Dairymens Association. 'The Court sustained
an objection based upon the grounds that such evi62
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dence v1ould be irrelevant and immaterial to the
issues and that no proper foundation had been laid
for the admission of such testimony. The matter was
considered in chambers ('Tr. 333, 334). It appears
apparent that as to the cause of respondent, Dairy
Distributors, Inc., the objection was well taken and
properly sustained.
Appellants also claim error in the admission in
evidence of respondent's Exhibit P-4. The exhibit is
a letter written to Edwin Gossner by Victor Dorman
informing Gossner that the Union would not permit
the unloading of Cache Valley Dairy Association
cheese which had been shipped via "Mid-States"
truck lines. The exhibit is certainly material to show
a course of conduct on the part of the Union and is
therefore and to that extent material to this cause.
However, even if that were not so, we call this
Court's attention to the fact that this letter was
produced upon the insistence and demand of appellants, the record shows :

"Q. (By Mr. Beck). What was the
reason Victor Dorman gave you- was this
conversation over the telephone or in writing
when he told you something about your cheese
not being un loaded?
1

A. I have some of it in writing and
some of it on telephone conversation.

Q. Will you bring us the communications you have in writing?
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A. I think I can.
MR. BECK: Make sure of that Mr.
Hanson, please." ('Tr. 91).
Appellants further claim the Court erred in
admitting respondent's Exhibit P-16 and say:
"That Exhibit purports to be an audit
of some of the books of plaintiff. The record
fails to show whether the books claimed to
have been audited were or were not received
in evidence. That being so, it would seem selfevident that the Exhibit was incompetent."
(Brief of Appellants, p. 106).
As to the books referred to by appellants here,
the record shows :
"MR. HANSON: We offer the Exhibit in evidence, P-2.
MR. ELIAS HANSEN: No objection
at this time, we probably will after we interrogate him further.
MR. HANSON: The books are available and the books have been available since
the suit started.
MR. ELIAS HANSEN: 'Ve have no
further examination of Mr. Hansen at this
time.
THE COURT: Do you have any cross
examination?
MR. ELIAS HANSEN: I may have a
lot of cross examination after I examine the
books." (Tr. 68).
Appellants thereafter had the books for the
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purpose of exa1nining them and the further interrogation of the bookkeeper, Arnie Hansen, nowhere
shows an objection to these exhibits ('Tr. 209-229).
Appellants made full use of the exhibits.
Finally appellants contend that the trial court's
refusal to grant a new trial was further error.
For all of your appellant's contentions under
Points XI, XII, XIII and XIV of the Brief of Appellants, no authorities for such contentions are directed to this Court's attention.
CONCLUSION
The verdict and judgment should be affirmed,
costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
HAN'SON, BALDWIN and ALLEN
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorneys for PlJaintiff
and Respondent
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